Becoming Americano
The Ascent of the New Latino Right
By Roberto Lovato
The Public Eye Magazine Spring 2007
After last year's elections, Lionel Sosa watched the returns and saw more than 30 years of his life's work
endangered. Sosa, the advertising executive who, along with close ally, Karl Rove ("we've been good friends a
long, long time"), engineered the GOP's historic advance among Latinos in the 2004 elections, had warned
party leaders of the consequences of the anti-immigrant policies of certain of its members.
Latino support for Republicans rose
from 21 percent in 1996, to 31 percent in
2000, to between 40 to 44 percent in
2004 (the number is still being debated).
In 2006, after the final results were tallied,
less than 29 percent of Latinos voted
Republican, and Sosa publicly "I told you
so'd" the GOP with comments like, "We
as a party got the spanking we needed." The
much-vaunted rise of the Latino Right
had reached, at the very least, a pause.
From his office in San Antonio, Sosa told
me, "I don't think everything I worked for
is lost." Asked why, he relayed an insight
given him by Ronald Reagan, who said that
Latinos "are Republicans and they don't
know it yet." Democrats should not see
Latinos "in their hip pocket," Sosa added,
because of their "conservative values" -
rooted in their religion, strong work ethic,
and traditional families.
Sosa is not entirely wrong. What will
happen to the rightward-leaning tendencies among the country's ultimate swing
voters depends not just on the political
machinations of the GOP, which just
appointed Cuban immigrant Mel Martinez
as chairman of the Republican National
Committee. Nor does the direction of
Latino politics depend solely on what the
Democrats - who just appointed Tejano
congressmember Silvestre Reyes as head of
the powerful House Intelligence Committee - do or don't do.
While influential and important, the
Machiavellian movements of the strategists and pollsters take place atop more
important institutions and subterranean
trends that will ultimately define the
direction of the Latino Right - and,
possibly the Latino politic. Chief among
these influences are the soft-power effects
of things like culture and religion, as well
as the hard-power pull of militarism and
jobs. The rightward tendencies among
Latinos have more to do with things like
some Latinos' embrace of a "white" identity (50 percent checked off "white" in the
2000 Census); the intensive focus on
Latinos by Roman Catholic and evangelical Christian churches, the military,
and the criminal justice system; and trends
not as easily measured by surveys or exit
polls. Such factors will determine how
deep into the rabbit hole of rightward tendencies Latinos will go.
The stunning drop of support for
George W. Bush and his party from approximately 40 percent (the best analyses confirm this number, not the 44 percent touted
by Rove and the Republicans) in 2004, to
the less than 29 percent support in 2006,
demonstrates only that the consolidation
of a Latino Right is not a completely done
deal.1 Sosa and Rove know better than
most Democrats and media pundits the
cultural, identity, and economic realities
that change minds. They expanded the conservative base by building on segments
and issues in the Latino community that
do tend conservative.
Nowhere is this clearer than among
reliably conservative Latino evangelicals. A
study by the Pew Hispanic Center concluded that much, if not most, of the
growth in the GOP's Latino support came
from Protestant evangelicals.2 While Latino
Roman Catholic support for Bush was at
33 percent in both 2000 and 2004, support
for Bush among Latino evangelicals mushroomed from 44 percent in 2000 to a 56
percent majority in 2004, according to
the study. While no detailed analyses of the
Latino vote in 2006 have been published
to date, it is safe to assume that these numbers reflect the discontent expressed by
Latino evangelical leaders since the introduction of the Sensenbrenner immigration
bill in December 2005, which offended
many with its call for a wall along the
U.S.-Mexican border and other harsh
measures.
Church leaders like the Reverend Luis
Cortes, Jr. have been organizing and lobbying aggressively in support of legalization
for the more than 12 million undocumented living in the United States. Cortes,
who heads up Esperanza USA, a network
of more than 10,000 Latino evangelical
churches, told Newsweek that Latinos -
including Latino evangelicals:
are unlikely to forget who made
them the focus and the scapegoat for
a failed immigration system. If the
Republicans continue, they will be
alienating Hispanics for decades.
Their only hope to win a national
election will be voter apathy. The
numbers are clear: by 2040 a quarter of all Americans will be of Hispanic descent. If the party wants to
alienate us, they are welcome. But I
don't think it is a sound political
move.3
Most mainstream evangelical leaders
reject legalization but some influential
ones have begun responding to Cortes' and
others' call. A new coalition, the "Families
First in Immigration" coalition, was
recently formed by conservative Christians to support more equitable immigration policy, and includes dozens of major
Christian evangelical figures, such ultraconservatives as Paul Weyrich, head of
Coalitions for America, Dr. Donald Wildmon from American Family Association,
and Gary Bauer of American Values, along
with David Keene with the secular American Conservative Union.
Reflecting both the political confusion
and growing threat posed by the complexities of evangelical politics, the coalition recently proposed a "compromise"
immigration proposal that includes punitive border security measures, an amnesty
for undocumented workers who are relatives of citizens, and an end to birthright
citizenship.
Strong bases of rightward-leaning Latinos exist in places like Martinez's Florida,
where South Beach anti-Castristas built a
political empire without equal in the
United States. Although they are less than
3.5 percent of the Latino population,
right-leaning Cuban-Americans, especially
those of south Florida, have influenced
national Latino and hemispheric politics
since the 1970s. But the still quite powerful South Florida political machine built
by Rafael Diaz-Balart, Fidel Castro's ex-brother-in-law who only recently died, is
undergoing major challenges. In the Cuban
American community, a new generation
that is more moderate than the old is coming of age, and conservatives must face the
fallout from their success in making it
more difficult to travel and send money to
Cuba. Meanwhile, massive numbers of
Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, and other
less rightward-leaning Latinos are migrating to Florida, adding to the pressure on
the conservative Latino machine.
Another major base of operations for the
workings of the Latino Right is Texas, the
state that is home to Sosa, Rove and a slew
of Latinos propped up as national leaders
including Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez, the now
disgraced former head of the forces in
Iraq, and others. Such "leaders" reinforce
the "conservative values" Sosa, Rove, and
Reagan tell us lie in the heart of Latino
Americans.
And these values are backed up by a kind
of national security Keynesianism and
acculturation. With the critical need to
increase Latino enlistment from 10 to 22
percent by 2025 (with black enlistment way
down), the Pentagon is spending billions
of dollars to identify, recruit and keep
young Latinos in the military. Bilingual
appeals to "Go Army" on Univision television and most other, more advertising-starved Latino media don't just turn Latino
media into mouthpieces for the military.
They also play to the community's economic needs with promises of higher education and training.
When we consider that millions of
Latino families will depend on the military
for their very livelihood, the intense recruitment of Latinos reflects clearly the role of
the military as a socializing institution
described by Machiavelli, Gibbon, and
more contemporary masters of national
security-driven statecraft like Samuel
Huntington. Nakedly laying out the acculturating effect of military service, Huntington, the former head of security
planning in the Carter Administration's
National Security Council, stated in his
most recent and controversial book, Who
We Are, "Without a major war requiring
substantial mobilization and lasting years... contemporary immigrants will have
neither the opportunity nor the need to
affirm their identity with and their loyalty
to America as earlier immigrants have
done."
That a fellow Democrat - and a Latino
- Louis Caldera, was the first to push and
implement the intensive recruitment of
young Latinos shows the limits of party and
ethnic loyalties. As the Secretary of the
Army during the Clinton Administration, Caldera launched the Hispanic Access
Initiative, inspiring similar efforts throughout the numerous branches of the Pentagon, all of which are cash rich and Latino
starved. This lust for Latino bodies connects
directly with the great needs of one of the
country's poorest, least educated groups to
create a different, more conservative, and
patriotic Latino in the mold of the state,
since military personnel tend to be more
conservative politically. Such practices date
back as far as Sparta and other city-states
of ancient Greece.
Using the military as a builder of nations
and national character and culture began
in earnest in the nineteenth century, when
then nascent countries used the armed
forces to build allegiance through what was
deemed a "school of the nation." In Latin
American countries like El Salvador, the
ascendant capitalist elites used the military
for multiple reasons. One of the major
functions of the military was to draw the
allegiances of native peoples to their tribal
structure, including tribal armies. Another
was to reeducate and recreate Indian identity in its own image. And, for those who
refused such acculturation and forced relinquishment of Indian land and life, the
military also served to provide a final solution to that problem.
Such socializing dynamics are not lost
on Rove, who, after working on a research
project at the University of Texas on the
work of the handlers and ideologues of the
McKinley Presidential campaign, came
up with the strategies that helped tilt the
Latino electorate rightward. Speaking of
McKinley's success among the German,
Irish, Polish and other immigrant groups
in the late nineteenth century, Rove said,
"A successful party had to take its fundamental principles and style them in such
a way that they seemed to have relevance
to the new economy, the new nature of the
country, and the new electorate."4 He
basically wanted to do what McKinley's
strategists did in the industrial age, through
messaging, policies, and jobs in the
digital age - and he almost succeeded
with the help of people like Sosa. Rove
added that "He [McKinley] basically made
it comfortable for urban ethnic working
people to identify with the Republican
Party." Rove and Sosa are clearer than
most about how institutions like the
church and the military are still among the
most influential socializing - and right-
leaning - institutions among Latinos.
Another institution that serves this
socializing function is the criminal justice
system. While most students of Latino
politics focus on the prisoner side of the
equation, nobody's watching the watchers
of the penitentiary behemoth: the exponential growth of Latinos working in the
criminal justice system headed up by
Alberto Gonzalez, hailed as the first Latino
Attorney General in US history.
At the same time, Gonzalez' ubiquitous
smile hides the tragic reality of the growth
of the Latino prison population from 17.6
percent in 1995 to 20.2 in 2005. It also
appears to celebrate the rapid and little-discussed rise in the Latino prison guard population. And at a time when national
security imperatives like those of the
Department of Homeland Security push
police departments across the country to
become more militarized, the cultural reality behind, for example, the 13 percent
increase (the fastest of any group) in Latinos employed in criminal justice between
2000 and 2003 means that more Latino
families will be tied to another institution
with powerful conservative influences.
Even as the families of incarcerated
Latinos lose considerable income with the
loss of a breadwinner, compare that to the
middle class opportunities offered to families of Latinos arresting, prosecuting and
guarding other Latinos. This cynical shift
in wealth endows economic value on certain Latinos at the expense of others.
A similar transfer of human value takes
place under the auspices of the Roman
Catholic and Christian churches that, like
the military and the criminal justice system,
depend on Latino bodies for their future.
Latino congregants are among the fastest
growing, most important groups in both
Roman Catholic and evangelical churches,
both of which are key players in the move
to create a Latino "values voter." The transfers of resources from the nonprofit sector
serving Latino and other poor to the religious community realized through George
W. Bush's "faith based initiative" makes
clear who is elect in the eyes of God and in
the eyes of the state. Organizations like
Cortes' Esperanza USA receive millions of
dollars that would otherwise go to secular,
nonprofit social service agencies that offer
the same services, but without the Gospel-
laden environment and messaging found
in their drug rehab, family planning and
other programs.
Though droves of Latino evangelical
leaders and their congregants abandoned
the Rovian project during the last elections,
in no small part because of immigration,
much of the cultural software - the conservative "values" emphasized by Sosa and
others - coded and massively distributed
by the GOP remains in place. The use of
abortion, anti-gay initiatives and other
reactionary wedge political issues will continue to play the conservative programming
with deep historical roots among Latinos.
A smaller, more dispersed, counterbalancing religious force can be found in congregations like Chicago's Adalberto United
Methodist Church (where Mexican immigrant Elvira Arellano was granted refuge
from immigration authorities) and other
churches now declaring sanctuary as part
of the immigrant rights movement. (Of
course, their numbers are small since Pope
John Paul II and then-Cardinal Ratzinger
purged the church of more liberation theology-oriented priests and parishes.)
Will Latinos continue their turn away
from the Right, continuing the momentum
witnessed in last year's massive marches and
during the off-year elections? That will
depend on how and whether the forces of
the left in the community can bring awareness and offer alternatives to the ideological workings of powerful institutions like
the Pentagon, the criminal justice system,
and organized religion. Equally important is the need to educate people about the
political nature of these institutions, as
well as show how, without Latinos, these
institutions may suffer great devastation.
We need campaigns to decrease the number of Latinos in the military and (both
sides) of the criminal justice system while
at the same time press local and national
Roman Catholic and Christian churches
to adopt positions on issues like the Iraq
war, Latino recruitment, rapidly growing
incarceration rates, and U.S. policy in
Latin America.
More of us need to understand how
Latino poverty creates the same pool or
hopelessness from which institutions like
the military and the church draw their economic and human resources. Many of us
grew and are still growing up in situations
that leave us few options besides the military, law enforcement, or jail. The reasons
for this poverty must be denounced at pulpits and legislative houses that remain
silent on these issues all the while loudly
affirming and defending "the sanctity of
life" and "family values." Democrats, leftists and others concerned about the future
of this soon-to-be "majority-minority"
country (as most of the top 100 cities
already are) should heed the call of the
voiceless and the choiceless.
Failure to do so will result in a Latino
politic in the service of empire.
Roberto Lovato is a New York-based writer
with New America Media and a member of
The Public Eye editorial board.
Endnotes
1Pew Hispanic Center, Latinos and the Midterm Election
(November 2006); Hispanics and the 2006 Election
(October 2006); Hispanics and the 2004 Election:
Population, Electorate and Voters (June 2005). (Washington, DC). http://pewhispanic.org/factsheets/factsheet.php?FactsheetID=26 .
2Ibid.
3David Gerlach, "Soiling Our Flag," Newsweek, June 6,
2006.
4Rove quoted in Dan Balz, "Bush's Iron Triangle Points Way
to Washington," Washington Post, July 23, 1999, C1.
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